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OPINION 
 
 McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
 Interstate Outdoor Advertising, L.P. (“Interstate”) 
appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
dismissing Interstate’s claim that the Township of Mount 
Laurel’s zoning ordinance prohibiting the erection of outdoor 
advertising displays is unconstitutional.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal.  
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Interstate filed development applications with the 
Mount Laurel Township Zoning Board of Adjustment 
(“Zoning Board”) in which Interstate requested approval for 
nine outdoor advertising signs that Interstate wanted to erect 
in the township along U.S. Interstate-295.  I-295 is a major 
transportation corridor with three lanes of traffic running 
through the township in each direction.  Thereafter, the 
Mount Laurel Township Council  adopted Ordinance 2008-
12,1
                                              
1 Ordinance 2008-12, titled “Prohibited signs,” states, in 
relevant part: 
 the constitutionality of which is challenged in this case. 
 
The following signs and sign-types are 
prohibited within the Township and shall not be 
erected. . . . 
(a) Billboards. 
MOUNT LAUREL, N.J., TOWNSHIP CODE § 154-84 
(2008). 
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Ordinance 2008-12 sets out a list of goals and 
purposes, each of which relates either to aesthetics or traffic 
safety.  Although Mount Laurel has regulated the use of signs 
since 1988,2 the 2008 ordinance incorporated two new 
provisions: Section 154-89,3
                                                                                                     
 
 which allows all privately-owned 
signs to display a commercial or non-commercial message, 
2 In 1988, Mount Laurel adopted Ordinance 1988-7, which 
created a zoning system used to control signage.  This 
ordinance included a specific ban on billboards in Section 
154-85, which states, in relevant part: 
 
The following signs are prohibited in all zoning 
districts:  
. . . O. Outdoor advertising signs (i.e., 
billboards).  
. . . S. Signs immediately adjacent to interstate 
295 and the New Jersey Turnpike. 
MOUNT LAUREL, N.J., TOWNSHIP CODE § 154-85 
(1998). 
 
3 Section 154-89, titled “Substitution of noncommercial 
speech for commercial speech” states: 
 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
Section or the Code to the contrary, any sign 
erected pursuant to the provision of this Section 
or the Code with a commercial message may, at 
the option of the owner, contain a 
noncommercial message unrelated to the 
business located on the premises where the sign 
is erected.  The noncommercial message may 
occupy the entire sign face or any portion 
thereof.  The sign face may be changed from 
commercial to noncommercial messages or 
from one noncommercial message to another as 
frequently as desired by the owner of the sign, 
provided that the sign is not a prohibited sign or 
sign-type and provided that the size, height, 
setback and other dimensional criteria contained 
in this Section and Code have been satisfied. 
MOUNT LAUREL, N.J., TOWNSHIP CODE § 154-89 (2008). 
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and Section 154-90,4
 
 which provides that Ordinance 2008-12 
shall be enforced in a content-neutral fashion. 
When Ordinance 2008-12 was adopted, Interstate had 
four billboard applications pending before the Zoning Board.  
In September 2008, the Zoning Board began holding public 
hearings on Interstate’s four applications.  Interstate presented 
expert testimony on both the aesthetic suitability of the 
proposed billboards and their negligible impact on traffic 
safety.  Despite that testimony, the Zoning Board denied each 
of Interstate’s applications. 
 
Thereafter, Interstate filed this lawsuit alleging that 
Ordinance 2008-12 violated the First Amendment guarantee 
of free speech.5
 
  After analyzing the constitutionality of 
Ordinance 2008-12 under the four-part test for commercial 
speech set out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980), the District Court granted Mount Laurel’s motion for 
summary judgment.  The Court held that the ordinance was a 
reasonable means of achieving the Township’s substantial 
interests of traffic safety and maintaining the natural beauty 
of the Township, that the Township enacted Ordinance 2008-
12 based upon evidence that it would advance those twin 
goals, and that the ordinance was reasonably related to 
achieving traffic safety and preserving aesthetics. 
                                              
4 Section 154-90, titled “Content neutrality as to sign message 
(viewpoint),” states: 
 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
Section or the Code to the contrary, no sign or 
sign structure shall be subject to any limitation 
based upon the content (viewpoint) of the 
message contained on such sign or displayed on 
such sign structure. 
MOUNT LAUREL, N.J., TOWNSHIP CODE § 154-90 (2008). 
5 Interstate also challenged the constitutionality of the 
ordinance under the New Jersey State Constitution, and the 
Township Zoning Ordinance and the Municipal Land Use 
Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq.  Those challenges, however, 
are not at issue in this appeal. 
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This appeal followed. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW  
 
We have jurisdiction to review a final decision of a 
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District 
Court had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. 
 
We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary 
judgment.  Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. 
Co., 316 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003).  In reviewing the 
decision of the district court, we assess the record using the 
same summary judgment standard used by district courts.  
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 
2000).  To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the 
moving party must demonstrate “that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “In 
making this determination, [we] must view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all 
inferences in that party’s favor.”  Farrell, 206 F.3d at 278 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 
Because Ordinance 2008-12 concerns both commercial 
and noncommercial speech, we must conduct two distinct but 
related inquiries.  
 
B.  THE IMPACT ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
 
 Ordinance 2008-12 clearly limits Interstate’s 
commercial speech.  Since there is no allegation that 
Interstate’s billboards are misleading or advance illegal 
activity, the billboards are entitled to the protection of the 
First Amendment.  Accordingly, the ordinance can only 
withstand Interstate’s challenge if it serves a substantial 
governmental interest and is no more extensive than 
necessary to advance that interest. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. 
at 566.  
 
Mount Laurel bears the burden of establishing the 
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constitutionality of  Ordinance 2008-12. Bd. of Trs. of the 
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).  “This 
burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; 
rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on 
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites 
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a 
material degree.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 
(1993) (citations omitted).   
 
The parties agree that Mt. Laurel has a substantial 
interest in both the aesthetics and safety of its highways.  
However, we must also consider the “fit” between the 
legislative ends and the means chosen to accomplish them.  
See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).   
 
Mount Laurel presented extensive evidence before the 
District Court to support its contention that Ordinance 2008-
12 directly advances the Township’s goals of traffic safety 
and aesthetics.  The evidence included a December 8, 2010 
report from the Mount Laurel Township Traffic Engineer that 
reviewed 37 articles pertaining to billboards and traffic safety, 
and concluded that limiting the number of driver distractions 
would advance the goal of traffic safety.6
                                              
6 These studies included: (1) the 2006 National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration Report, “The Impact of Driver 
Inattention on Near-Crash/Crash Risk: An Analysis Using the 
100 Car Naturalistic Driving Study Data,” which found that 
23% of accidents that occur in metropolitan areas were the 
result of drivers taking their eyes off the road for two seconds 
or more; (2) “Forensic Aspects of Vision and Highway 
Safety,” a 2001 study concluding that driving distractions that 
cause drivers to take their eyes off the road are likely to result 
in poor vision of the road; (3) the Madigan-Hyland Study, 
which showed that 32% of accidents on the NY State 
Thruway occurred on the 13% of the highway with outdoor 
advertising; and (4) the Milwaukee County Stadium Variable 
Message Sign Study, which showed that vehicular accidents 
increased by 8% to 35% (depending on the type of crash) 
immediately after a billboard was installed adjacent to 
Milwaukee County Stadium on I-94.  The District Court 
excluded one study cited by Mount Laurel for irrelevance, 
“Standards for On-Premise Signs,” by the United States Sign 
  The evidence also 
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included expert reports and deposition testimony of the 
Township’s planner.  The planner testified that Mount 
Laurel’s sign control ordinances had effectively preserved the 
“billboard free aesthetic charm and character” of the 
Township for 23 years. 
 
Interstate offered its own expert testimony to rebut the 
Township’s evidence.  Interstate provided testimony from a 
traffic expert who explained that, according to an accident 
analysis of the I-295 corridor using the New Jersey 
Department of Transportation’s crash records database, the 
accident rate in the area of Interstate’s proposed billboards 
was well below that which would indicate a hazardous 
location.7  Interstate’s traffic expert also testified that several 
studies indicate that there is no causal relationship between 
the presence of billboards and accidents.8
 
   
On appeal, Interstate questions the reliability of Mount 
Laurel’s studies.  Interstate claims, inter alia, that those 
studies merely establish a correlation rather than causation 
between billboards and traffic accidents and that the reports 
rely on faulty data.9
                                                                                                     
Council, as it was designed to study only on-premise signs 
rather than off-premise billboards. 
  Lastly, Interstate argues that the 
7 Neither Interstate nor its expert appear to have considered 
the proposition that the precise reason the accident rate is so 
low in these proposed locations is because there are no 
billboards on those portions of the roadway. 
8 The District Court noted that one of these studies, the 
Virginia Tech Study, which concluded that there was no 
statistical correlation between billboards and traffic accidents, 
was funded by the Outdoor Advertising Research and 
Education Foundation, an industry-sponsored organization.  
The Court also noted that the study had numerous 
methodological flaws, which was the reason another district 
court deciding a similar issue of billboard safety in 2005 
excluded testimony from the study’s principal investigator, 
Dr. Lee. 
9 Interstate maintains that the correlation is not indicative of a 
safety concern because billboards are placed on highways that 
have the most traffic. Thus, argues Interstate, those highways 
are more prone to accidents because more vehicles use them, 
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locations where it seeks to post billboards are along the multi-
lane, heavily trafficked, Route I-295 corridor in “heavy 
industrial zones” outside of any residential or scenic views, 
and that Mount Laurel’s concern about preserving aesthetics 
is therefore overblown.  
 
According to Interstate, the testimony it offered 
created a genuine issue of material fact that had to be resolved 
by a fact-finder, rather than at the summary judgment stage.  
Interstate relies on Viking Yacht Co. v. Composites One LLC, 
622 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.N.J. 2009), in stating that “[h]aving 
competing admissible expert testimony on a particular issue is 
the epitome of a disputed issue of fact.”  Id. at 203.  
Moreover, Interstate points out that Mount Laurel never 
challenged the admissibility of Interstate’s expert testimony.  
Interstate therefore argues that the Court should have 
permitted a fact-finder to weigh each side’s expert’s offerings 
at trial rather than concluding that Mount Laurel was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Interstate’s position ignores the context in which this 
issue is presented.  As the Supreme Court explained in 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), 
each method of communication has its own set of laws, and 
“[w]e deal here with the law of billboards.”  Id. At 501.  In 
Metromedia, the Court noted that it “has often faced the 
problem of applying broad principles of the First Amendment 
to unique forums of expression.”  Id. at 500.  The result is that 
“[e]ach method of communicating ideas is a law unto itself 
and that law must reflect the differing nature, values, abuses 
and dangers of each method.”  Id. at 501 (internal quotations 
omitted).  Billboards, by their very nature, are capable of 
communicating a vast array of messages to a very large 
segment of the public.  “But whatever its communicative 
function, the billboard remains a large, immobile, and 
permanent structure which like other structures is subject to . . 
. regulation.”  Id. at  502 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(ellipsis in original).  
 
In Metromedia, the plaintiffs argued that the city’s 
ordinance would eliminate outdoor advertising in the City of 
                                                                                                     
not because of the presence of billboards. 
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San Diego and “the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibit the elimination of this medium of communication.”  
Id. at 503–4.  
 
In the context of billboards, the Supreme Court has 
deferred to the collective judgment of both legislatures and 
lower courts, and highlighted the importance of considering 
the plainly unattractive nature of billboards when evaluating 
whether a billboard ban directly advances a local 
government’s interests in traffic safety and aesthetics.  In 
rejecting the plaintiffs’ challenge to San Diego’s ordinance, 
the Court explained: “[i]f the city has a sufficient basis for 
believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are 
unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the 
only effective approach to solving the problems they create is 
to prohibit them.”  Id. at 508.  
 
 In Metromedia, the City of San Diego presented no 
evidence that its ban on off-site commercial advertising 
directly advanced the city’s stated goals of traffic safety and 
aesthetics.  Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring).  Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the ban on billboards was 
justified by concerns of aesthetics and traffic safety.  Id. at 
508–10.  The Court’s conclusion rested on “the accumulated, 
common-sense judgments of local lawmakers and of the 
many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial 
hazards to traffic safety.”  Id. at 509.  The Court also 
recognized that “billboards by their very nature, wherever 
located and however constructed, can be perceived as an 
esthetic harm.”  Id. at 10 (internal quotations omitted).  
Moreover, there was “nothing . . . to suggest” that the 
legislature’s judgments regarding traffic safety were 
unreasonable.  Id. at 509.  The force of the deference the 
Court afforded San Diego’s judgments regarding aesthetics 
and safety is controlling here.   
 
Nor are we persuaded to the contrary by Interstate’s 
reliance on the industrial nature of the disputed stretch of  I-
295 where Interstate wants to place its billboards.  As noted 
above, Interstate relies in part on the fact that the area is 
already industrialized and unsightly.  According to Interstate, 
the Township’s interest in preserving the appearance and 
preventing the aesthetic deterioration of the highway should 
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weigh less heavily on the constitutional balance.  We 
disagree.  The industrial nature of the highway does not 
mitigate Mount Laurel’s concerns about the aesthetics of the 
highway.  In fact, it may well suggest an even greater need to 
guard against the deterioration of the Township’s character 
and evoke a greater concern for safety. 
 
Interstate attempts to distinguish the situation here 
from the facts in Metromedia by relying on the substantial 
evidence it presented to disprove the basis upon which the 
Township enacted Ordinance 2008-12.  According to 
Interstate, here, unlike in Metromedia, there is something “to 
suggest that these judgments are unreasonable.”  Metromedia, 
453 U.S. at 509.  Interstate thus claims that the blind 
deference to legislative judgment that Mount Laurel 
advocates pursuant to the analysis in Metromedia is 
inappropriate here.  The argument does have superficial 
appeal. 
 
However, we do not accept that the mere presentation 
of contradictory expert testimony so undermines the 
legislative fit between a law’s intended ends and its practical 
means that it necessarily precludes summary judgment in 
favor of the township, absent a showing of bad faith.  The fact 
that some of the township’s studies can be challenged 
academically in no way undermines the Supreme Court’s 
deference to local governmental and regulatory judgments 
about aesthetics and safety insofar as the placement of 
billboards is concerned.   
 
Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that Interstate 
has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Mount Laurel’s traffic studies establish mere correlation of 
billboard placement and accidents or the requisite causal 
relationship that Mount Laurel claims, we would still 
conclude that the ordinance would survive the challenge 
because it advances the township’s substantial interest in the 
aesthetics of the community.  As the Court explained in 
Metromedia: 
 
It is not speculative to recognize that billboards 
by their very nature, wherever located and 
however constructed, can be perceived as an 
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‘esthetic harm.’ . . . . Such esthetic judgments 
are necessarily subjective, defying objective 
evaluation, and for that reason must be carefully 
scrutinized to determine if they are only a 
public rationalization of an impermissible 
purpose.  
 
Id. at 510.  But here, as in Metromedia, “there is no claim . . . 
that [the Township] has as an ulterior motive the suppression 
of speech, and the judgment involved here is not so unusual 
as to raise suspicions in itself.”  Id.  Accordingly, there is no 
issue of fact as to whether the prohibition of billboards “is 
directly related to the stated objective[] of . . . esthetics.”  Id. 
at 511.  The fact that the ordinance advances that substantial 
interest in a manner that, although all inclusive, is 
nevertheless not overly inclusive given the impact of 
billboards on a community, is sufficient to allow Ordinance 
2008-12 to survive Interstate’s challenge even though it has a 
very real impact on Interstate’s commercial speech.  
 
In its reply brief, Interstate relies on both Edenfield 
and Pagan v. Fruchey in arguing that the Township is 
required to demonstrate specific proof  that it satisfied the 
Central Hudson inquiry.  Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770–71; 
Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 776 n.8 (6th Cir. 2007).  
According to Interstate, Metromedia does not compel 
summary judgment on either the issue of traffic safety or of 
aesthetics, because Mount Laurel failed to prove that 
billboards are per se hazardous, or that billboards are 
incompatible with the Township’s stated goals regarding 
aesthetics. 
 
However, as Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in 
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), local 
governments need not generate their own site-specific studies 
before enacting an ordinance: 
 
The First Amendment does not require a city, 
before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct 
new studies or produce evidence independent of 
that already generated by other studies, so long 
as whatever evidence the city relies upon is 
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reasonably believed to be relevant to the to the 
problem that the city addresses. 
 
Id. at 51–52 (emphasis added).  The fact that Mt. Laurel’s 
studies are subject to academic challenge does not negate the 
fact that there is nothing on this record to suggest that the 
Township did not reasonably believe those studies to be 
relevant to the problems it was trying to address.  Rather, the 
record here supports but one conclusion: Mount Laurel relied 
upon evidence that directly pertained to the problems the 
Township was addressing by enacting the challenged 
ordinance. 
  
Against this background, we have no trouble concluding that 
Interstate’s challenge to the validity of Mount Laurel’s 
studies falls short of creating a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Mount Laurel’s legislative judgments were 
“facially unreasonable” or “palpably false.”  Metromedia, 453 
U.S. at 509.  Even when viewed in the light most favorable to 
Interstate, we readily conclude that neither the attack upon 
Mount Laurel’s studies nor Interstate’s own contrary evidence 
would allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that there 
was an insufficient basis for Mount Laurel’s conclusion that 
its billboard ban would directly advance its stated goal of 
improving the aesthetics of the community.  
 
 Moreover, given the language of Metromedia, we are 
not willing to conclude that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the ordinance sufficiently 
advances the substantial interest of traffic safety.  Although 
Mount Laurel did not undertake any site-specific studies 
before enacting Ordinance 2008-12, the 37 studies that Mount 
Laurel relied upon when enacting its billboard ban cannot be 
said to be insufficient, even when viewed in conjunction with 
Interstate’s expert testimony and studies.  Mount Laurel’s 
conclusion that billboards affect traffic safety and aesthetics 
is neither “facially unreasonable” nor “palpably false.”  
 
 Interstate also argues that Ordinance 2008-12 is 
excessive because it goes too far and institutes a total 
prohibition of billboards.  According to Interstate, Mount 
Laurel’s goals of traffic safety and aesthetics could be 
achieved with a less restrictive ordinance that allows 
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billboards in certain areas and under particular conditions.  
However,  as we have already explained, in Metromedia, the 
Court reasoned: “[i]f the city has a sufficient basis for 
believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are 
unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the 
only effective approach to solving the problems they create is 
to prohibit them.”  Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508.  Thus, the 
Township took what was “perhaps the only effective 
approach” to addressing its concerns for the aesthetics and 
safety of its highways—a Township-wide ban on billboards.   
 
 We therefore conclude that Mt. Laurel has satisfied its 
burden of establishing that Ordinance 2008-12 is not overly 
extensive and that it advances  substantial interests of the 
township.  
 
D.  THE IMPACT ON NON-COMMMERCIAL SPEECH  
 
As we noted earlier, the Ordinance also limits 
noncommercial speech.  Such regulations are constitutional 
“provided that they are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”  Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); 
Frumer v. Cheltenham Twp., 709 F.2d at 874, 876 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
 
This aspect of our inquiry does not require much 
discussion.  The text of the ordinance specifically states that it 
will be applied in a content-neutral fashion, and we have just 
explained that it directly advances substantial governmental 
interests.  Interstate alleges that the complete ban on billboard 
messages does not allow for alternative channels for 
communication.  Specifically, Interstate argues that, although 
various alternative means of communication may be 
available, those means are not available to the specific target 
audience of the drivers traveling on I-295 that would be 
reached by the proposed billboards.  Potential alternative 
channels of communication include on-premise signs, internet 
advertising, direct mail, radio, newspapers, television, 
advertising circulars, advertising flyers, commercial vehicle 
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sign advertising, and public transportation advertising.  
Interstate claims that these alternatives are inadequate 
because they are limited to area residents and miss the large 
numbers of people who drive through the area on the 
interstate. 
 
However, “maximizing . . . profit is not the animating 
concern of the First Amendment.  The fact that restrictions 
prohibit a form of speech attractive to plaintiff does not mean 
that no reasonable alternative channels of communication are 
available.”  Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, N.H., 
513 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2008).  Therefore, the mere fact that 
Interstate will not be able to reach the distinct audience of 
travelers on the particular section of I-295 that it desires to 
target does not mean that adequate alternative means of 
communication do not exist.  That fact is underscored by the 
Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that complete billboard 
bans may be the only reasonable means by which a legislature 
can advance its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Mount Laurel. 
